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As 1985.1 s "Man of the Year," Federal President Richard van Weizsacker
observed in conjunction with the fortieth anniversary of the coll apse of the
Third Reich, -"a question does not simply cease to exist because no one has an
answer for it, especially when the state of affairs is such that it keeps
raising the question anew.• 11 1

The intensity· with which politicians i·n -the

Federal Republic have debated· such issues as the NATO deployments, the Bitburg
visit, Chan.cellar Kohl's participation in the Silesian refugees' reunion, and
the

11

open 11 or· "closed" nature of the Oder-Neisse borders over the last two

years leads but to one conclusion: · The German Question is still very much
a 1 i ve, sti 11

unanswered and sti 1 l

capab 1e of sending new waves of anxiety

washing across the ·states of Eastern and Western Europe.
alone has not provided a definitive- solution_ to

The passage of time

the conundrum of German

. national --; den ti ty and European security.
The resurgence of interest in the German Question seems to have taken
· many foreign observ.ers by surprise, especially the extent to which the idea of
a

German

"national

consciousness"

has

intellectual and peace movement circles.

become

salonfahig - in

leftist

_The reaction from outside can be

more· accurately described as·one of-surprise and discomfiture, mixed perhaps
with a bit of embarrc1ssment over (a rare display of) historical "indiscretion"
on the part of prominent German politicians, e.g. Kohl I s blunt questioning of
Andropov in July, 1983, as to whether he, as a Soviet patriot, would be happy
living in a divided Moscow ·in a divided ·soviet Union.2

The discomfiture

experienced by neighbors · to both the East and West does not derive from the -•
perception· that the two German
something

to·

effect

their

states are suddenly

actua 1

reuriifi cation.

in_ a position to do

More

important

is

the

ever ... present if' amorphous concern that after four decades· of compfiance and
complc1.cen~y, the two ·states might once again engage in unpredictable, aberrant

2

behavior that is somehow inherent to the

11

German national character."3

Surprise and embarrassment provide a convenient smokescreen for what this
author judges to be the real reaction to this born-again German Question on
the

part

of

ambivalence·.

allies·
The

and

most·

11

adversaries
obvious 11

alike,

answer ·to

namely, .. one.
the

German

of

conscious.

Question,

viz.,

reunification,. is pe.rcei ved to pose a most ·ominous threat to the balance of
European and superpower . forces . that has evolved si nee 1945.

Against the ·

backdrop of two world wars, outside powers would prefer· to live with

11

the

11

problem" rather than take on the risks associated with tithe solution.

But what, exactly, constitutes the core of the German problem?

The

countries of Europe, including the two Germani es, have managed to eschew the
ravages of war.. for

four

decades.

The Federal Republic and · the German

Democratic Republic have both come to assume positions of political and
economic preeminence within their respecthe blocs.

As separate entities,

they have. cultivated a degree of social security and· solidarity.never before
witnessed in German hi story~

Other industrial states l oak to German economic

.and technological achievements in the postwar era with a mixture of respect,
envy and -- inevitably -- - trepidation. · Does the problem of a resurgent furor
teutonicus

capable

of · reinflicting. its

insatiable

quest

for

power

and

. Lebensraum on the weaker states of Eurppe exist primarily in the, minds of the
( -

beholders? · Does the'. current constellation ofpolitical, economic and military
forces

dictate . that wh·at was· and . is

.

.

conceivably
.

-

good ..for

the

Germans

.

necessarily is and will remain bad for everyone else?
The

11

c·onscious ambivalence 11 posture manifested by members of both the

Eastern and Western camps,· at 1east.- since. the early 1980 1 s, owes in part to
the ·general uncertainty as to what it is
the short term or in the long run.

11

the Germans 11 really

want,

·either in

Not that this uncertainty precludes other

3

international actors from making many assumptions about what citizens in the
two sta_tes should and could aspire to after forty years of di vision. · Neither·
the uncertainty nor the corresponding as sump ti ans, this author postulates,
reflect the extent to which the German Question has been transformed over the
last decade a·nd a. half,

largely as a result of Ostpol i ti k developments

initiated by then-Chancellor Willy Brandt~

But the very. success of earlier

Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik initiatives in reducing the tensions between
the FRG and the GDR has given birth to i nterna 1 demands for a

II

pac.if i cation 11

of the two Germani es that external balance-of-power advocates find equally
unsettling. · Improvements in FRG-GDR relations have moreover given birth to a
set of political paradoxes that compel the German states themselves to adopt a
-posture of_ conscious ambivalence regarding their common "future perspectives."
II.

The German Question
· Quest,ons, · the answers

has

been

transformed

to which - entail

into

a number

of German

a variety of mutually exclusive

prerequisites. The analyses presented by Cooney' et !J._., Flynn· and Rattinger,
Schulz and Danylow, Schwarz and Weidenfeld are representative of the different
paradoxes that emerge, depending on which German Questions are posed and which
are accorded priority by forces

inside ~nd outside -Germany-divided.

For

simplicity's sake, I will ascribe a single P.aradox to each. one of four of the·
wor~s

cited above;

this

is

not

to· deny,

however,

the · extent .to· which·.

overlapping arguments and·interactive effects constitute "the stuff" of which
Realpolitik

·is·_ made.

They: will

bear

the ·following

labels-: · _1)

the

Nation/State. Identity Parado.x; 2) the. Reunification/Integrat.ion Paradox; 3):
.

the Stability/Security Paradox;. and
Paradox.

.

.

4f the· i'Lessons of History /Normalcy
11

In each case, the .discussion will focus on the question "What do ·the

Germans want?" as posed by the individual ,works•cited above.

An assessment of

4

the overall significance of the German Question thus tranformed, and possible
reverberations for the Atlantic Alliance -- as depicted in the. fifth text -wi 11 be reserved for the concluding section of the essay.
Insofar as this essay rests on the premise that: the• transformation of the
German Question is largely the result o.f dramatic changes that have occurred
in the domestic and global, political-economic and geo-strategic environments
since

the war's _end,

the· author· feels. compelled to

summarize

important changes before undertaking to describ~ each paradox.
or

developments

are

responsible

for

a

renaissance

not:..yet-cl early-defi ned-but-nonethel ess-hotly ... debated

of

the more

What factors

interest

pan-Germani sm?

in

a

Con-

sidering first the dramatic- changes that have not come to pass since 1945, we
observe, from the Germans' perspective:· First, the failure of "the Six, 11 then
"the Nine" (and most probably "the· Twelve"), to bring about the permanent,
supranational integration of Europe foreseen by the- founding fathers of the·
Common . Market.

Especially

among

the

younger _ generations, · the_ European·

community - is sooner perceived as. a bureaucratic mono 1i th in its own right, ·
rather than as an alternative to the-regulation, hierarchy and the ineffective
use of resources found within the nati anal . boundaries. . Secondly, deterrence
strategies and protracted arms control negoti ati ans have moreover fai 1ed to
treat the sources of antipathy and distrust between nations.
.

.

-

Recent NATO and

.

Warsaw·Pact modernizations have failed toprovide the ultimate clients· of
.

.

.

.

.

their ·· respective -·a11 i ance systems with a sense of · more, _rather thari 1ess
security.'
In addition to these non-deve 1opments, we c_an cite five changes that have
occurred which also appear to have contributed to a renewed interest in the
· Gennan

question.

First,

under

the

labels of

interdependence - and

5

post-industrialism,

the

nation-state

has

lost

many. of

its

traditional

functions -- only to acquire new ones often more difficult to balance and
fulfill .4

The 1970' s witnessed a reemphasis on the iinportarice of "national

interests II in the· wake of resource shortages and rapid fl uctuati ans in the
international climate •. No state wishes to render its own. ability to survive
comp 1etel y dependent upon th_e good wi 11 of the co i 1ecti ve, especially in the
event

of

a serious

deterioration

in

East-We~t or

s~perpower relations •.

Secondly, by the end of the 1970.'s one begins to find traces of a growing
consciousness (and dissatisfaction) regarding the lack of symmetry between the·
reality of· West German economic strength and influence and the artificiality
of limitations upon the FRG's exercise of political power in regional and
1

international affairs~

This rejection of a long-sta nding "political_ dwarf,

economic giant" characterization goes. hand-in hand with West Germans' evolving
interest. 'in wielding grea-t:er influence. abroad -- both can be interpreted as a
11

sign of normalization, of· th.e FRG's

comi.ng of political agell under a set of

firmly established 1 iberal-democrati c institutions.

Thi rd, . after forty years

of unquestioning 1oyal ty to the al~ i ance, · the. West Germans have begun to give
'

'

voice to an expectation that they have earned a more· sympattieti c hearing and
more

active . support

for

their . efforts

to

alleviate . the

"human

costs

11

associated· with the ongoing division of · Europe not entirely of their own
.

.

.

:

.

making. · They would prefer to be· appreciated, rather than feared, in 1 i ght of
the

disproportionately

heavy ·-risks. now

consciously _associated· with

conecti ve security requirements to which they "voluntarily" ascribe.
a generationally.:.linked

11

the

Fourth~

v·a1ue · change" is making itself- evident-· among the.

younger~ better educated segments: of the population no longer inclined towards.
an uncritical

acceptance · of American.· dominance.· in Eur_opean affairs.
.

The

.

American· image in Europe· has changed, linked in part to. changes in attitudes

6

of the Americans toward Europe, and in part to Europeans' changing assessment
of themselves and their capacity for independent diplomatic action.

Changing

perceptions of the US, in particular~ have precipitated a crisis of confidence
among the Western allies, bolstered by military-technological developments
that render a decoupling of American and European/German security interests
possible if not probable.

Finally,

Verhandlungspolitik,

toward

Germany"

geared

popular acceptance .of Ostpolitik and·
improving

relations

.with

seem to be i rreversi b1y entrenched in the FRG,

"the

other.·

cons ti tuti ng an

important plank in the platform of all four parliamentary parties.

Treaties,

accords and .negotiations between the two Germanies have acquired a, dynamic of
their own, the concrete gains of which will not be traded lightly for abstract
promises by alliance partners.

Public support for rapprochement has remained

stable through "good" and•.''.bad weather 11 periods in East-Wes_t relations.5

All of the developments, and non-developments,· cited ~bove offer• only
partial

explanations

at

best

as·. to

why

the

German. Question

has

been

tran·sformed and why it is making its way back on to the_ European political
agenda~

More, important for our purposes. is how the German• Questions have been

modified and how they rel ate .to each other.
III.

For those bold -- or brash -- enough to enter the phi 1osophi ca 11 y dense,
historically dark thicket of German ·nationalism, Werner. Weidenfeld'-s edited
·volume provides a multi-dimensional., politically provocative and· critically
.self-reflective overview of the many· p'at~s to be taken in · search of "the
German· identity."· ·The

definition

of· 'identity

applied

throughout. this

collection of essays by prominent (and predominantly) Germa~ academics derives
from Erikson's concept, of . a reciprocal

relationship between a . permanent,·

· self-contained consciousness and a continuous, U partial,. participation in a

7

collective, group-spec_ific orientation (p. 18).

The array-of topics covered

in fifteen chapters by individual contributors -i~ consistent with Weidenfeld's
threefold aim to: · treat the past and the present. more or 1ess equally as
constituent e~ements of the German identity; -to balance the negative against.
the positive aspects of the German character in its various developmental
phases; and· to al low for - the interplay of three potentially competitive
identities, rooted in the Federal.Republic, the German Democratic Republic and
the all-German- nation, respectively.·
The specific Germari Question addressed in this work can be broken down
into three points of inquiry.

The first -- what do the Germans "really want? 11

-- is easily answered in the form of a generally accepted proposition:

The

Germans are searching for a new identity that will· liberate them from the
pre..:i945_profile of the "guilty Nazi 11 and the postwar image of "vassals" in an
.

'

· an occupied state.6

The second and third queries, namely, ".which identity do

they mean, and what shal 1 comprise its substance.? 11 ·along with "why do they
need lt, and what will they do with· _it? 11 find no definitive answer either
among these authors. or within the Federal Republic at 1arge. · Constitutional·
imperatives

introduced.

in

1949,

when

juxtaposed

against

the

political

realities of the 1970 1 s and 1980 1 s, give rise to the Nati on/State Identity
Paradox that renders. these questions unanswerable in either· the short or the
. 1ong run •

. The .. parameters of. the Nati on/State Identity Paradox are specified by
:the Preamble to the West Ger~an Grundgesetz ("Basic Law 11 ) which is to serve as
the provisional constitution until that day •When it shall be replaced by one
ll_freely decided upon" by all ·Germans, not just- those residing in the Western
zbnes [Article.146/GG]. · As Eberhard Schulz has noted, however, the imperative
contained· in the· Preamble - to the Basic .Law' is. in· fact addressed to das

8

specify the eventual creation of a unified set· of state institutions.

Th,e

emphasis falls not on unity~~ but on "unity in freedom. 11 7 Looking to the
once-and:..future nation, the Federal Republic is not free to cultivate an
\

identification with itserf in- the, form: of a- self:-contained Staatsbewusstsein
(that is,

a "state consciousnessll

that would sit more· deeply than mere

system-affect), for fear of overriding or excluding the prospects for a new
Nationalbewusstsein.

Yet, Willy Brandt's January, 1970 formula for the lltwo

states in one nation, 11 when coupled with Egon Bahr's 1963 prescription for

.

Wandel durch Annaherung (a "moving closer" to East Germany intended to produce
the internal changes necessary in the GDR to allow for the free determination
of a new;

shared constitution)

implies that FRG citizens would have to

identify first with their own state as a stepping stone to an eventua 1
identification with the other state and, hence, with the nation-reunified.
·. · The GDR has avoided the Nation/State Identity Paradox by assuming a more·
positive orientation towards its own-.nation.;.ness, having largely disassociated
itsel·f from the fascist past.
existence

internally

by

In a concerted effort to legiti-mize its own

elevating

its

status·

in. the

court

of

other

nation.;.states, the GDR dropped its 1968 title of "socialist state ·of the
German nation" _and redesignated itself
1974 ~

the

.

'

11

the socialist German nation-state" in
-

The _last ten years- have witnessed a conscfous attempt · on the part of

·srn

leadership to

,· replacing _the adjecti-ve
various

organizations

11

de-Germanize 11 its half of the former· Reich, e.g. by
11

German 11 with the label ."GDR-nationa·l 11 in the names of

and. publications'.8

Constitutional

and

statutory

revisions· undertaken in 1974 were part of a bold campaign to confront the
· ·".national." problem head~on with the formula "citizenship:
German. 11

GDR, nationality.:

While the.· leadership may have escaped the i den ti ty paradox at the .

·official 'level, it is nonetheless a long way from resolving the

11 split

image,"

9

"double life 11 and non-identification problems witnessed at the grassroots
level, as illustrated in the chapters by Rudolph and Grunenberg.
But wait!
of

11

Perhaps national reunification need not be structured in terms

blood and iron,lla· shared set of governing·institutions, mutua,Hybinding·

political .processes and policies~.

Its longstanding "demarcation" (Abgrenzung)

policy notwithstanding, the East German leadership is suddenly rediscovering a
common

history,

rehabilitating

Friedrich der Grosse.·

the

likes

of Luther,

Bismarck

and. even

Is there a new,•. constitutionally permissible German

identity waiting. to be forged within the framework of a Kulturnation, as
opposed to a Staatsnation?

The: crystal-ball

becomes no clearer with this distinction.

.

ima~e of a new German nation

As the historicaJ treatments by van

Thadden, . Bussmann, Sturmer, van Bredow · and .Rovan demonstrate, das deutsche
Volk needs to know where it has come .from· in order to determine where it is
going~

·But the

return

to · a

commmon · historical

foundation

provides-· no

guarantee that a people-divided will either interpret this history in the same
1 i ght or derive the same lessons for the ·future.

"For the Germans of the

GDR, 11 van Thadden notes, the Reformation took place in Wittenbe.rg, for the
Germans of the FRG in Worms; [it is]· only unfortunate that fn both cities it
was the ·same Luther" (p.57).
11

Reliance on the Kulturnation-alone results in

commonality without identity" (p. 84).
The Federal.· Republic . is. thus· 1eft to its own devices.

Rausch,

von

Krockow and Mommsen ascertain that_ the West German identity is in flux -- or
at least the pol.itical consciousness. and· social values seem _to be.
these- not

the·. core - elements· of

a· new· BRO-national

But are

identity. Schweigler.

discerned ·a decade ago?9. What becomes. of the two-states-in-one-nation minus
one state (the GDR)?

Are we left with one state plus one nation, or do we get ·

two nations _in the_ longer ruri?

Weidenfeld 1 s ·. prognosis is that the Germans

.I
10

wi 11 learn to live with an i den ti ty of many layers, that separate FRG- and
GDR- "state consciousnesses 11 will move into the foreground; the desire for
self-determination will persist, as will the diffuse, psychological support
for the reunification mandate found in .the, Basis Law. The Preamble· functions
as a Bekenntnis ohne Bedurfnis, a profession of fa.ith,. not a call to action.10
The national consciousness will consist .of ·a

11

passionless 11 but nonetheless

stable acceptance of democratic values and institutions.

The new Heimatgef:uhl

will be more social than nationalistic.
· In summary,

the Nation/State Identity Paradox

requires

no

immediate

action -- the passage of time will provide the ult_imate resolution~

The·

Federa.l Republic is less of a Provisorium than the rhetoric of politicians
infers.

Those who would argue· that reunification remains the charge for 1ater

generations no longer find a. positive ech·o·among the public, for
accepted by her c.itizens as their state •.11 11

11

the FRG :is

What the population in realfty

perceives. as open is not the all _.German but rather the inter-German question:
.

-

.

'

IIHow is the relationship of the Germans in the two German states·to each other
to be ·shaped, · this is the question that currently and intensely moves. these
human. beings, not the question of a new state formation."12
The Federal Republic is unable and unwilling to pursue alone.~the special
German way 11 against which H~ttich, Hassner and Sontheimer would caution. The
.
poss.ibility that the".two··Germanies togethermight embark upon a:special
'

course, in search of neutralism,
contradicti.ons

and

for example, is· fraught· _with even more

qualifications;

against

nati.on/state paradox begins to pale.
the property of the Gennans 11

(

p •· 84 ff) .

which

the

compJexitY. of

After all, the German Question

11

the

is not

11

IV.
The German Question is and, in fact, always has been a European Question.
Both became an American Responsi bi 1 i ty as a matter of military necessity, not
by- virtue of political choice.
of World War

II,

the

Emerging relati'vely unscath.ed from the: inferno

United. Sta.tes. "in

a. splendid. act

of

practicaJ ;.

self-serving ideal ism, 11 established the Marshall Pl an and related· assistance
mechanisms to secure the rapid economic reconstruction of a liberal-democratic,
Europe •. 13 . American support for moves towards the creation of a United States
of Europe was grounded in the twofold belief' that-, first, a Germany thus

a

integrated would be

German· democratized and. demilitarized; and, secondly,

that a recovered Europe would assume ever more responsibility for its own
.

.

.defense while providing a growing, cooperative market for the disposition of
American exports.
has

remained

What the United States acquired. instead was a Europe that.

militarily

dependent while· becornfog

economically ever more

competitive.•.
The study of FRG-US relations in the larger context of European-American
· relations offered by Cooney et!!_. is a story of mutual. disappointment and
cultural estrangement . . This particular collection of essays summarizes the

. deliberations of some 40 s_ocial · theorists and political practitioners invited
__ by the Woodrow Wilson Centerin 1983 to examine the growing divergencies in·
economic policies" and security preferences as
.

.

·a

function of value changes that

.

have_ begun to . occur on both sides of the Atlantic. · A sense of undefined
urgency·underlies the collective appeal for a search for policy alternatives.·
. to. sustain and strengthen· the ",special relationshipll seen to exist between the
F:RG and the US.
•As Craig . argues, .what is special about this relationship is not only the
fact that it -has lasted some 300 years.

Historically, Germans and Americans

12

11

have both been considered

outsiders 11 (the latter by choice) from which they

derived a ~ense o~ 11 exceptionalism 11 and came to manifest a certain xenophobia

.

.

\

v, s-a-v, s Europe.

In recent years both have been -plagued by a crisis of

confidence in their respective economic miracles, as Cooney and Jones contend •

••
Lowenthal
and Mo·ltmann emphasize that· the US national · 11 identity 11 (as well as
_its image abroad l has moreover been shaken by- the traumiti c experiences ofVi et Nam and Iran.· While_ the two countries share a forty-year commitment to
free market preservation and military containment, the differences in their
preferred styles and strategies for pursuing these- goals have now moved into the foreground.

Their respective searches for identity and for a return to

power appear to be leading.them in very different directions.
The German Question
-reads:

~

European Question that emerges in this context

What are the specific political, economic and security prerequisites

that mu·st be met in order to· permit:· the eventual reunification of Germany?
0

Further, what does the Federal Republic. 11 really want" from the United States
as a means of enhancing its prospects for-overcoming the postwar division?
As

many·

intellectuals

and

Deutschlandfrage are fond of quoting,
divided. 11 14

politicians
11

preoccupied

with - die

Germany is di v·i ded because Europe is

But this is only one of two·main reasons that lie behind.the

German division.

_The breakdown in relations between the US and the Soviet-

Union·, followed by the formation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, _along
with the overarching -i deologfcal · confl i c.t between East and West, are factors _
-

.

-

.

-

-.

.

,

responsible for the official Crea ti on and- mai ntehance of two separate German
-

.

states~_ But in accordance with ~on Weizsacker' s eloq-uent appeal, it is not -

-

the end of the war that provided the . catalyst for division. ---The source of the
,

'

'

'

.

.

'

'

..

'

-•many.· human· hardships facing the peoples of both state_s in. the· postwar- era
'

.
that led
'

-

11

lies in- the beg1nning of that. regime of violence

to war.

We cannot

13

separate the 8th of May 1945 from January 30, 1933. 11 15
Hence,

Germany· was

divided

to. ensure

its

denazification,

its

democratization and pacification; there was 1ittre agreement· as to the best
strategy for achie.ving these objectives between the competing ideologkal.
powers of East· and West, however·.

By 1955 ,. Germany-divided had become the

s.ymbol as well as the stage for a dramatic heightening of tensions between the
superpowers.

Much of the confusion and controversy over the ·"openness" of the

German Question now stems from the emphasis placed by different actors, at
different times, on one or the other of these
the two Germanies.
. set

down

for

11

reasons 11 for_ the existence of

This. confusion is manifested in the paradoxical conditions

'German

reunification

within

the

framework

of

European

integration~·
The Reunification/Integration Paradox has its origins Jn the incomplete
nature of the Ya 1 ta and. Potsdam. agreements. · The 1ack of a final peace treaty
· and the col 1ecti ve. nature of Four Power· responsibility duri_n_g the occupation
years kept the dream of reunification alive for inhabitants of "the zones."
But the deeper the .diVi-sion became between the superpowers, \he- more ·committed
to Western· values the· Federal Republic appeared to be, and the more actively
prepared the Germans were to accept the necessity of a defense contribution of
their own,

the sooner the Western powers could tolerate their claimed right

11

· · to· reunification, even in contractual terms., 1952-1954."16

·Ge~many - cannot

hope to reunify· -without . the active support of its. ·European . neighbors or
· ·without the concurrence of. the· Sov·; et Uni on.

The more thoroughly integrated

the FRG strives to become in the West European Cominunity,the more she,expects
· to win trust and ·support for her efforts to, move closer _to · the GOR.
'

'

-

should reca1 l , however, that it was France 1 ·s desire not

One

to see German reunited

that 1ed to. de Gaul le' s early push for European integration.

'

.

Furthermore, the

14

more i nsti tutiona 1 i zed and permanent the FRG' s commitment to the West, the
more unacceptab 1e her efforts to integrate or com.bi ne with the GDR wi 11 become
to the countries of Eastern Europe, e.g~ Poland.
A thirty-year identification with- the European community has complicated,.

if not strained, the Federal Republic's ties to the United· States, whose

approval and security guarantee are absolute 1y essenti a 1 to the FRG' s desire
to avoid an "integration. by force" with the East: Wha.t the West Germans
ostensibly seek from the US is an end to the further "Americanizatfon" of
their economy .and culture

the loudest demands being posed by the_ peace and

· "alternative" movements so unloved by Schwarz. 'This is paralleled by the call
for a halt to the "Europeanization" ·of the political and economic costs for
'

'

security-related policies no longer viewed as sensitive to "German interests."
The · US· has

responded

with

hurt-surprise

to

(alleged) . manifestations of

anti-Americanism, especially iff the FRG; yet it overlooks the_ adverse impact
of its own '.'seemingly erratic impositions of egocentrism" on the. European·
economies, e.g. in the form of high interest rates and protectionist _measures,
as described by Jochimsen and Biedenkopf (p. _148ff).
Federal

Republic

remains

"a

net

importer

of

The fact that the

security"

imposes_ other

domestic-economic costs as well·, argue Joffe _and May (p. 181). · Schlesinger
admits.that American fears of an ultimate Soviet takeover are probably no more
(un)realistic than European watchfulness-mixed-with-faith that the. economic
· ent.i cements growing out of the detente ·era wi 11 subdue the red· bea-st.
-

-

Stern

.,

warns that Bonn- should not. be forced-to choose, either ·between the .United
· . States and Europe, or between Western Europe and German-German rapprochement.
The.trick is to find strategies that permit
as much· diversity as necessary. 11

11

as·much congruence as possible,

The plea is for· .the United States to adopt a

more flexible response to the sea change in European economic interests and_

15

security preferences.
The attainment of economic stability based on. liberal-market principles,
and · an unshakable ·commitment to democratic i nsti tuti ans are but two· of the
prerequisites West Germans must.demonstrably fulfill, if the-Preamble is ever
to become a. political. reality.

Inevitably, however, the reestablishment of

national unity will only become possible· ''when it .appears to the Germans and
all other.powers who determine the ·fate. of Europe-to be less. dangerous than
the maintenance of di vision. 1117

In other words, not even ti me wi 1l reso 1ve

this paradox -- not until East-West antagonisms are permanently 1aid to rest.

v.
Nowhere are the "differences" between American· an,d European needs arid
interests more apparent than in the area of military and strategic defense
policy.

While a majority among the West German-. political, industrial and

military elites continues to support riucl ear deterrence as the best defense ·
.

.

.

.

against possible Soviet aggression,18 a critical - vociferous segment of the

.

~

pub 1 i c has shifted in favor of detente and d1 sarmament as the key to European
security.

As inconsistent and sporadic as its involvement in foreign po 1icy

deliberatio_ns has been since the 1950's, the often uninformed l'public" has
emerged as a participant to and object of current national security debates.
This was nowhere more evident than in the Federal Republic during the "Hot
Autumn of 1983" when peace movement organizers succeeded in mobilizing an
estimated 2-3 million demonstrators and sympathizers in· opposition to Pershing
II_ and cruise missile deployments.
followed

in the wake of actual

The ostensible !'demobilization". that

deployments

suggests, ,however,

that the

publ ici s role in these debates has yet to stabilize -- and the· policymaker' s ·
role becomes more complicated as a- result. On the one hand, the political
leadership

bears

responsibility

-

for "designing and pursuing defense and

16

security policies

that promise

to· be effective according to established

military and strategic criteria, while simultaneously taking into account new
realities of the social context surrounding national security ••• " (p. 102).
On the other hand, it cannot ignore.· a possfb le eros.i on of public support for
the Atlantic. Alliance which holds

11

deep. i1f!plications regarding the. process of

legitimizing defense and military strategy in Western'democraciesll (p.102).
Flynn and Ratti nger, along with
potential

their

six co-contributors,

approach

shifts. in public 'Op,i ni on in reference to security issues with a

sensitivity rarely found among a multitude of survey research analyses of this
order.
more/less

Without

entangling

themselves

sophisticated statistical

in

the

procedures,

never-ending
these

authors

debate

over

effectively

explore the interpretation problems inherent in questionnaire.:wording, as well
· as in our general lack of knowledge as to how foreign policy attitudes are
actually fanned.

The result ·is a work that is· methodologically digestible and

politically . thought-provoking ' for . even

the

most

11

unquantitati ve 11

of

comparative researchers.
, Each chapter offers a country-based review of public attitudes towards
defense, with a sp_ecial emphasis on mass orientations since the mid-seventies·
(when foreign policy was at last "discovered" as an important subfield. by
survey re~earchers themselves).

The analyses of public opinion data compiled ·

. from a variety of sources in Britain; France, the Federal. Republic, Italy, the
Netherlands~ Norway and the United States are organized .and· .developed around
four axes or

11

imc1ges. 11

.

The first, ·Images of the Sovi"et Union, looks' to

differences 'in- ·the· Sov.iet . "threat" as perceived .by American and . European
citizens at large~

Th·e second focal point, Images· of Security, juxtaposes

internal against external, economic against military factors, as a source of
increasing popular uricertai nty and .discontent~

The thtrd set -of concerns

17

revolves around Images of Deterrence,· in light of growing public suspicions
11

that the

cure 11 of nuclear war might be 'worse than the disease of Savi et

encroachment.

The final axis, Images of Allies,. is applied to problems of

rel i abi 1 i ty, trust and mean·i ng.fuL communication between the United States, on
the· one hand, and its European partners, on the. other.
As important · as each of these chapters is in the 1arger · framework of
Atlantic relations, two stand out as particularly relevant to the task· at
hand, name-ly, Rattinger 1 s essay on

11

The Federal Republic of Gemany:

About (Almost) Nothing,." and the editors' joint conclusion.

Much Ado

The analysis of

polls conducted in the FRG revea 1 s an extremely complicated set of internal
and external

security concerns unique to a divided Deutschland.

The most

_ important German Questions to arise in thfs. context pertain to the current and
future

status of the Federal

Fi rs t;
11

one

needs

to

Republic

inquire

in the ,western- military alliance.

whether - the:

spectres

of

pacifism

a:nd

neutro-nationalism 11 _raised by_ discussions _within· the peace movement have

fundamentally altered the nature or strength of West Germans' commitment to
.

NATO.

.

-

.

'

What do the citizens of the Federal:Republic expect and demand from the

Alliance?

Secondly, do their expectations differ significantly from those of

other NATO- members?

Thirdly, what price are the Germans prepared to· pay in

terms of security risks, if neutralization ·and non-alignment are presented as
the-preconditionsfor·reunification?
Recent -empirical

efforts to test· the waters. bf German public opinion.

demonstrate-. that" the tide has not· yet shifted a:ga,nst Alliance membership per
se. --

even

supporters.19

when

the

sample

is

heavily

sprinkled .with ·peace

movement·

Some 56% of those affiliating themselves with the Green Party

in Mai,. 1983 considered NATO·. "necessary,11 despite their rejecti_on. of the
pending Pershing II

and

cruise missile deployments

(pp.

166-167). There

18

appears to be little disagreement regarding the overall importance of American
security guarantees; when faced with a direct choice between NATO-membership.
and neutrality, the former prevails over the latter by a significant margin -70% to 17%. in February, 1982 and. 72% for continuing·- membership versus 9% for.
wi.thdrawal in August, 1983 (p. 144).
Thus, the first. question is more easily answered than· the second~

The

West Germans evince rio incJination· to withdraw· from a collective defense
system that, up to now, has gua.ranteed them an historically unprecedented
degree of internal stability and external security.

They nevertheless appear

to be interested in redefining their status in NATO in such· a way as to permit
th.em a more active, participatory role in Alliance decision-making.

The call

. is for more prior consultatfon (not "briefing") and genuine codetermination
.

.

with respect to the choice• of tactical weapons systems and regional defense
strategies, on the- one hand; they prefer, on the oth_er hand, greater autonomy
in the conduct of foreign policy where "German. interests" are involved.
Codetermination and autonomy are no doubt rights that the Bonn government
would exercise only with great caution, trapped as it is between the rock and
the hards pot of a unique security paradox.
The Stability/Security Paradox finds expression ·in the ruminations of
Rich~rd Lowenthal, who holds that the Bundesrepublik·,· some thirty years after
her foundfog, has become the_ most stable of the larger Europ~an states; when

a~. price

measured
agai~st
such objective standards
.
.
.

rates, or:electoral succession.
it.

Objective stability
'

•

'

i-s

The problem is"; her citizens cannot believe
not matched

' . .
o

stability, unemployment

.

•

by_ subjective security· -- ·
. 11 dem
I

Selbstverstandnis der Bundesdeutschen fehlt die Selbstverstandlichkeit."20
. The reasons for. this perceived insecurity derive as much from the present as
· from the past.

The ideological division· of Europe_ compelled the two German

19

states to engage in frequent, often vehement public disavowals of each other's
domestic and foreign policy achievements during the first twenty years of
their existence, in order to demonstrate fidelity to the ideological precepts
imposed.

by , their

respective.

superpowers. . Efforts-

to

secure

the:

po.l itical-economic survival of one German state were perceived to pose an
existential threat to the other.

'fet, the• very. division of Germany that has
11

held the two halves hostage to a

provisional 11 state of insecurity unter sich

has itself·. become one of the stablest elements in the_ ongoing,

globally

destabilizing confrontation between the Eastern and Western blo.cs.,
Both history and geography make· it impossible for either Gennan state to
divorce questions of national

security -- and the issue of its postwar

half-national identity -- from the dialectic of international relations.
Federal Republic seeks

11

The

maximal coupling with· minimal provocation. 11 21 . While

'
the general perception · of the overall
Eas,t-West military balance has not
· undergone a significant change in · recent years,· the public I s main worry has
.

shifted from military strength · to
spending

nor

the

expansion

of

11

keepi ng

.

the peace. 11

the .Bundeswehr are

viewed

Neither defense
as

11

extremely

important; 11 the peace movement :draws sympathy, but not necessarily· active

· commitment.

In short, "military· defense is endorsed by public opinion much

more easily· as ·an abstract principle than its burdensome practice ••• 11 (p.
When the llugly 1abel II nuclear weapons is affixed, llit has no chance if

127).

it is up against more. 'civilized' -concepts such, as negotiation and detente 11
(p. 127).

Taking

the

authors•

many

methodological.· and

cognitive-theoretical

qualifications into account, the Federal Republic -is.shown to possess a rather
stable set of, · images
.

regarding ·, the So~i et . Uni on,

internal , and· external

.

securi'ty, imperatives, albeit_ with a new sensitivity to the inherent dangers of

i

20

a reliance on deterrence.

It is the last set, Images of A11 i es, that p.rovi des

evidence of subtle but significant changes fn public orientations, and yields
at least a partial answer to the question of German

11

different-ness 11 vis-~-vis

other Alliance partners.
The conclusion drawn by Flynn and Ra t_ti nger· is that the West German
public tMnks pretty much like other European publics,_ but perhaps
. The real differences li.e .between .European and American perceptions;

11

more so. 11
Partners

east of the Atlantic are now inc.lined to view, the Soviet Union as a more
11

normal

adversary, 11 ·one to be lived with. and negotiated with, rather than

"wiped. out 11 in a. messianic confrontation between the. superpowers. - Security
defined in primarily military terms is judged inadequate, as more weapons on
either side mean 1essened prospects for peace.
11

Ded i ni ng confidence in the

rationality 11 of either a graduated or an extended deterre!lce strategy is

linked to the public's general loss of faith in the
decisions made by political/technical·elites.

11 expertl'·character·

of

The ever more attentive.publics

are prepared to pay the social and financial pr,ice of European security only
to

.the

extent. that

Alliance

policies

are

perceived

11
(

to

.

.

be ·defensive
.

structural non.:.offensi ve capacities"); otherwise they wil 1. impose politic al
.

costs of their own.

.

Even the craziest or most

might encounter in the FRG is no less

11

.

11

.

chaoti c 11 peace protester one

rational, 11 no more

11

aberrant 11 than the

citizens -of other Alliance states in rejecting the proposition that one's own
country may have to be destroyed in order to,be defended.
VI.

-

Divided or reunified, neutralized or allied, the.two German states will·
.remain physically and, therefore, politically in the middle of the East:..West
conflict.

In no_ position to· 11 drop out 11 of the international, bi polarized
.

.

system, the Germans· appear :to have but one other ·option for securing their

21

survival,

mutual

namely,

to

cast

aside

their

common

political

sack-and-ashcl oth roles donned in 1945 and assume the cl oak of power accorded
to other

11

normal 11 sovereign states·.

This alternative, seeking to ensu.re that

th.e security needs of one's own country·. prevail through the responsible
exercise of power, is likely to resurrect the• original German Question, albeit
adapted

to

1980 1 s

constraints.

Do

the . ·calls

11

for · a

communi ty

of

responsibility," a "coalition of reason;" and a:"security partnershipll mean
· that borders will be maintained but their character radically altered?
the

two

parts

again

moving

to

reestablish. somethin.g

Gesamtdeutschland, through confederation and reunification?.

Or are

bigger~

a

Have the Germans

suffictently atoned for sins of the past, three generations removed - o.r does
"original sin" leave its black mark on· the souls that forever·follow?

What

evc1dence can they deliver "that will convince-the rest of the world that they
have learned their lesson and have become all the better for·it? 11 22
In a two-part work on "power politicsll and. the·. "style" of West -German
foreign policymaki~g, Schwarz argues that postwar Germans have truly - become.
.

different.

.

He holds that their proclivity for- l'too little" attention to the

former has become almost as bad to "too much."

The Germans once obsessed with

power have banned its use from the collective political memory, ·and thus
deprived themselves of a capacity for pragmatic-purposive maximization of
their own interests.

"The tamed Germans. of _the Federal. Republic have come

much farther afield than 'the German_ -Reich with _its nervous striving for a.
place .in the sun 11 (p. 39).

Bonn's initiatives over the last 10 years have

resulted. in a network of diplomatic and economic engagements· that allows its
representatives to move with self-assurance into.those regions and states once
closed to their forefathers/mothers. But Schwarz admonishes that the Federal
.

.

'

.

.

· .. Republic manifests both _anxiety and· arrogance (especially vis-a-vis the United

22

States)

in

policymaking. Instead
sobri ety 11

has

a

scorning
"the

adopted

an

power-pol i ti ca1

cured

approach

alco~olic ·as. the

anti-stati st,

to

foreign

preacher of universal

naively . moralistic

dream-role as

harmonizer and peacemonger.
It appears that

II

the Germans more than, many other peop 1es cultivate the.

extremes in the· style of their· international activity: · sometimes berserk,
somet.imes the friendly household pet lacking any instincts against danger 11 {p.Whatever 11 taming 11 of the Germans remained to be· don.e, subsequent to the

58).

experiences of the capitulation and occupation years., was eventually effected.
by

group

pressu.re

and ··the. imperatives

mu_ltinational foreign policy entanglements.

of

routi'nized

adaptation

to

Schwarz maintains that "adherents

to the so-called peace movement" who demand a denuclearized, bloc-free Germany
are "without appreciation for the disciplinary and behaviorany stabilizing.•
effect of the multilateral system" {p. 41, p. 47).

Yet the general thrust of

his own argument is to urge that the. Federal Republic udo more~• and "do less 11
'·

simultaneously to render its geopolitical
combat growing domestic
permanent provisionalism.

position less vulnerable and to

resentment over its condemnation to a state of
11

Without a hard core of patriotic responsibility

towards one's own country, towards one's own liberal way of life, for the
welfare and power interests of one's own state •.• ," the,Germans have become
11

politicians and citizens who pr~dominantly lay _their sacrifices before the

altar of· international order and cooperation, and: forget that· :their own land
.

.

will sooneror later be punished by ·the gods 11 .{p. 151).
The· concurrent,

rather

contradictory· calls· ·for

more

multilateral

cooperation and· a stronger emphasi ~ ·ort Germany's_ 11 own".. interests _,;_ even to
the point of possible withdrawal.· from NATO -- reflect a growing gap between
- the

II

successor · genera ti ans~ 11

In undertaking· delayed efforts to

"conquer

23

Germany 1 s past, 11 members of the

11

Economic Miracle 11 -and

11

Long March through the

I nsti tuti ons II generations have drawn very different conclusions' for the FRG I s
present and future
11

foreign

policy course,. which

firid. expression

in

the

Lessons.of History 11 /Return to Normalcy Paradox.23
11

We have learned the lessons of history 11 • is a declaration oft repeated by

Helmut Kohl, at age 56_ the first Chancellor wtth no direct experiential link
to the events of 1933~45 {who also speak~ of
late 11 ) .

The national

11

the blessing of having been born
11

shock of shifting from

major power 11 to

11

no power 11

status has produced internal political· asymmetries, leading in turn to errors
of judgment and behavior that the Germans themselves mistakenly perceive to be
11

normal • 11
The Alliance partners would· like

to

believe that the Germans

have

· thoroughly mastered the 1essons of hi story· and· that they have indeed become
11
•

b'etter; 11 they are sympathetic to the two ·states• desire to avoid, serving as a.
'

-

•.

, potential Ground Zero. · But ·should the two attempt to· disentangle themselves
.

.

from. the never-ending risk of a major·· superpower confrontation., the
Germans are immediately suspected _of trying to establish somethi"ng
.

-

.

.

.

-

11

11

tamed 11

greater. 11

.

· Common. efforts to - con~reti ze their respective· 11 ·dream rol es 11 as harmonizers and
.

.

peace mediators -- even at the rh~torical ievel of

11

security. partnership

raises the _anxiety level and generates counter-pressures .abroad.

11
--

From ·this ·

one necessarily concludes that neither the Federal Republic nor its eastern
counterpart have yet to be perceived,as normal states.
11

Schwarz contends that

even the self-torturing efforts to conquer the~p~st Should S?on belong to the·
.

past

11

.

(p. 141L . Nevertheless, 'the

.

.
11

. '

lesson of history/ the acceptance and

mastery of which was/is expected to resuit in a return tp normalcy among
subsequent generations, is that the Germans have never been
probably wi.11 not be treated as such for. a· long time to come ..

11

normal 11

. --

and
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VII.

In being· transfonned from one into many, the German Question(s) have
perhaps acquired new meaning for the 'future course of the Atlantic Alliance.
For neighboring and partner states, the most ·important Question made in
Germany entails a. mixture- of o·ld and· new- elements, namely, reunification and
what are variously known as the "Dutch Question," the "Austri~n Solution" and
fears

of. "Finlandization.11

For the citizens of the nation-divided,

the

fundamental task ahead is that of resolving the new German-German Question- in
a manner

promoting

"sectirity,S'- "peace"
potential

a

symbiotic

and

relationship

"autonomy."

Instead

threats to one's own national

between

"unity/'

"freedom,"

of reacting- rashly .to the

security attributed to "too much"

inter-German rapprochement, the Western ·powers face an obligation to lay the_
old German Question permanently to rest; .Schulz and Danyl ow suggest, by
offering a more attr~ctive alternative coupled with· realpolitische concessions (such as chemical- and nuclear-free zones)., .Simultaneously, the Bonn and East_
Berlin governments must clearly arid publically diVorce their shared objective
of overcoming the negative human costs of ·div.i si on from the anachronistic aim of reunification.

The power to assume greater direct responsibility for their

own defense might serve both
.national

in rechanneling overreactive neutralist or

aspirations, while domesticating in~ernally divisive debates over

security policy by stabilizing and,domesti'cizing them~24
.

.

.

.

-

-

'

·Must. the German Question -- with an emphasis on the elimination of the
mental

and

physical · wal 1 s

that di vi de
'

its - people

--

be

resolved

in

'

- fonna 1-1 ega l terms i,_n order to guarantee the strength and ef.f ecti veness of the
Atlantic Alliance?

Or,: what will happen if- nothing happens? ·For the United

States, Britain,: France and the smaller partner states-, the answer is cl early,
no.

As

Grosser

defines .the

situation, - "the· Western

allies

only

want

25

reunification as long as it is impossible," while an American source notes "we
are not being asked to do anything about. the- German Question, and we prefer
not be asked. 11 25
Is the. Federal

Republic's loyalty to the Alliance jeopardized by or

dependent upon a fi na 1 sol uti on to the German Question?

In the short tenn,

the answer is,. for the most part, -no, as -long as she is not compelled to
choose between the United States and· Europe, between West integration and the
improvement~ intensification of German-German relations.

The longer-range

answer al so reads, probably not, al though i t i.s conceivable that the FRG could
later insist. upon some compensation (·e.g., in the fonn of a veto over theater
nuclear missile "release" or ·greater tactical. flexibility within its own
borders) in exchange for her "vol untaryll renunciation of the right to nattonal
·reunification.
Movement in ·the- search for a new~ post.:..postwar, Gennan identity can be
construed as evidence that the citizens of the Federal Republic have begun to
·develop· confidence . in themselves and in

their own "free.:..democratic basic

order" -- a development meriting the active support of her Western partners.
The emergence of independent peace and ecology. groups,

along with Erich

Honecker' S· own "damage limitation" activism since the 19~3 commencement of

...

NATO deployments, indicate that Wandel durch Annaherung has occurred in the
GDR as well as in the FRG •

.

'

Moreover, both have -become subject . to Annaherung

. durch Wandel in the global economic· and strategic environment.·•.
If

one

accepts

the

verity

of ·ttie French

ax_iom-,

c 1 est seulement le

provi soi re qui dure,. -then the members. of the Alliance· will have =to consJder ·
the extent to· which a strengthening and deepening .. of ties between-· t.he two
Gennan Republics· can - and must contribute to . the future stabi 1 i ty _of the
region.26

If it is ·not true that only the provisional, namely, the existence

26

of two-states.,.in-search-of-nationhood, will prove the most cpermanent feature
of the postwar global order, then one would be well advised to heed. the
.

..

ff

warning of ~easoned statesman, Richard von Weizsacker:

"The German Question

will remain open' as long as the Brandenburg Gate remains· closed. 1127

The

opening of the Brandenburg portal · and the Wall of which·. it has become an
integral

part, will

constitute a· most neces.sary but not,

sufficient condition for the 11 closing 11 of the German Question.·

I contend,

a
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